By: Dr Faiz-ur-Rehman
An armed clash that erupted on October 8, 2025 between Pakistan and Afghanistan ended several days later in a fragile ceasefire. The intense exchange of fire along the border occurred while Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi was visiting India, a development that stunned many observers. When the Taliban regained power in August 2021, Pakistan’s ruling circles initially celebrated. Their optimism stemmed from the belief that 65% of Afghan military officers were linked to the India-friendly Northern Alliance and that Afghan soil had been used for anti-Pakistan activities, particularly to support the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Addressing those concerns, former ISI chief Lt. Gen. Faiz Hamid visited Kabul in September 2021. After reaching an understanding with Taliban leaders that Afghan territory would not be used against Pakistan, he declared to a foreign journalist, tea in hand: “Don’t worry, everything will be fine.”
That casual statement triggered a backlash in Afghanistan. Anti-Pakistan elements framed it as proof that Islamabad wanted to dictate terms to the Taliban and claim credit for their victory. Within Afghanistan, pressure mounted against Taliban leaders to resist external influence. Persistent mistrust defined bilateral relations. During his recent visit to India, Muttaqi publicly asserted: “Afghanistan is a free country and we will not take dictation from anyone.” The symbolism deepened when he stood beside India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar and declared Jammu and Kashmir “a part of India,” while also announcing that India’s technical mission in Kabul would be upgraded to a full embassy, an unimaginable sight in 2021. What happened in just four years that pushed the Taliban closer to India, a hardliner Hindu nationalist government? Experts note that rival forces successfully exploited Pakistan–Taliban tensions after reports emerged that a Pakistani think tank held a conference inviting all Afghan groups except the Taliban. Additionally, reports suggesting the Taliban resisted a U.S. demand to hand over Bagram Air Base, triggering “regime change” fears, drove the Taliban to seek regional allies, including India.
Pakistan’s recurring strategy supporting non-state groups instead of pursuing consistent state-to-state relations continues to generate blowback. History shows that removed governments often turn hostile once in power.
The 1996 Taliban takeover led the ousted Northern Alliance, previously Pakistan’s partners, to become adversaries.
After 2001, the Karzai and Ghani governments allowed their soil to be used for anti-Pakistan activities. In 2025, Pakistan faces a similar situation: its airstrike on Kabul politically united Afghans, even silencing traditionally pro-Pakistan factions such as the Haqqani network.
Whether Taliban-India alignment will last remains uncertain. India seeks influence in Afghanistan to balance China and Pakistan and deepen access to Iran and Central Asia. But India will tread cautiously, the Taliban’s past links to Kashmiri militancy pose diplomatic risks.
Inside Afghanistan, the Taliban faces internal pressures as restrictions on women, media control, and a struggling economy could spark a future conflict with anti-Taliban groups. India must consider that the Taliban lacks territorial access to India and that reliance on Iran’s Chabahar Port could trigger complexities due to U.S. sanctions.
For now, each side fulfils the other’s short-term needs: the Taliban needs funding; India wants a strategic counterweight to Pakistan. History and political theory warn against reliance on non-state militants because such groups prioritize their own interests, expand their networks and ultimately harmful to the state that employs them.
Pakistan and Afghanistan also entered this crisis with unrealistic expectations. Pakistan seeks peace, wants Afghan soil not to be used against it, and desires transit access to Central Asia. Islamabad accuses the Taliban of supporting the TTP and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). But internal Taliban dynamics, tribal, ideological, and kinship based, prevent them from acting against the TTP. The Taliban fear that cracking down could push the TTP toward ISIS, destabilizing Afghanistan.
The Taliban argue that TTP militants are Pakistani citizens who should be repatriated. Some Pakistani left-wing analysts, assert that the Taliban government is a U.S. Project which is designed to control Central Asian resources and limit China’s access to Gwadar and beyond. If we accept this, two elements become apparent. First, the TTP will continue attacking Pakistan’s security forces with the aim of paralysing law and order to sabotage CPEC, thereby disrupting China’s access and influence over Gulf oil via the Gwadar Port.
This is also the TTP’s means of livelihood, power and survival.
Second, China and Russia will seek to keep the United States away from the Central Asian states, and for that they need a stable government in Afghanistan; in this respect Russia has already recognised the Taliban government. In such a struggle, Afghanistan is once again likely to be swept into crisis.”
Pakistan’s strategic depth policy, outsourcing national defense to militant proxies has failed. Now, from here onward, policymakers will have to determine that if what happened in the past was correct, then they should continue it. But if mistakes were made in the past, then one must not keep repeating those mistakes, because lava always erupts where it has been heating up.
Therefore, in order to rectify things, reforms must be made in the existing system, such as reform religious seminaries, integrating modern education to break the cycle of radicalization. To escape the current crisis, Pakistan must abandon outdated security paradigms as war is not an option, especially for a debt-burdened economy.
Instead, Pakistan should negotiate TTP repatriation, disarm them, and provide rehabilitation and economic reintegration.
In order to steer all the institutions in the right direction, there is a dire need to strengthen the judiciary, ensuring all cases are processed without institutional interference.
The new Army Chief’s ‘hard-state’ doctrine narrative may make sense for a state like India, but it does not seem workable against the Taliban, because the Taliban’s interim government, whose constituent groups are all ‘by-products of war’ follow their own tribal traditions.
They respond to threats with threats and to war with war. It is essential that peace with the Taliban government be pursued not through war, but on the basis of equality. This is both their demand and their psychological position. Otherwise, in the event of war, the Taliban will prefer guerrilla warfare over conventional battle. Such a war would not only be prolonged, but its centre would not be Afghanistan, it would be Pakistan, because an effective network of militants is already active inside Pakistan. History proves that “the damage is always suffered by the country on whose soil the war is fought.”
Strategically, Afghanistan and Pakistan share mutual dependencies where Afghanistan requires Pakistan’s trade routes while Pakistan needs access to Central Asia. Foreign policy should be driven by interests, not emotions or illusions of brotherhood. Pakistan should establish a joint security and border monitoring mechanism with Afghanistan. Taliban must realise that
“The Durand Line” is an internationally recognized border on which previous Afghan governments never raised an official objection with Pakistan, therefore, their claim it is as an “imaginary line” seek political leverage, not legal revision. Rationally, both countries must shift from confrontation to cooperation based on respect and equality. In today’s world, no country can impose outcomes through force. Peace is not just preferable, it is the only viable strategy.